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The Nuremberg Code recently celebrated its 50th birth-
day, marking the progress that has been made in ensuring
respect for human rights both within and beyond the
context of medical research [1]. Today, many journal
editors will refuse to consider manuscripts that have not
undergone formal review by an independent committee,
and virtually none will publish results that were procured
without the explicit informed consent of the subjects. In
one sense, therefore, the bioethics movement of the past
several decades seems to have scored a resounding victory.
In another sense, however, the rapid pace of medical
research and the increasing effectiveness of medical inter-
ventions have only intensified the ethical dilemmas that
physicians encounter in clinical research. The intensive
care environment, in particular, has several characteristics
that provide especially difficult challenges to the standard
requirements of informed consent for research. I will
highlight three features of this environment that may call
for innovative or alternative approaches to both study
design and the process of informed consent to both
respect the rights of the research subject and permit the
continued accrual of medical knowledge.
First, many trials performed in critical care medicine
involve experimental treatments that have the potential to
be life saving. Patients who are eligible for studies in the
intensive care unit (ICU) are often extremely ill, and stan-
dard therapy may have little or nothing to offer. While
clinicians may be able to take a dispassionate stance and
insist that from the perspective of the medical scientist
there is no evidence that the experimental therapy is
superior to conventional treatment, the patient or family
may have a very different impression. They may hold the
firm belief that the experimental treatment offers the only
significant hope for the patient’s survival. From their per-
spective, randomization may not represent the process of
choosing between two equally effective alternatives, but
rather may be a seen as a coin flip between a chance for
survival and an almost certain death. Indeed, there is
evidence that families misperceive the process of
randomization as a mechanism for triaging patients when
a therapy is too scarce to offer to everyone [2]. This feature
of ICU research creates intense ethical conflicts for clinical
researchers, and will be explored in more detail below.
The second characteristic aspect of intensive care research
that leads to unique ethical issues is the fact that very few
of the potential research subjects are capable of engaging
in a discussion of informed consent. Either patients are
too heavily sedated to permit their participation in delib-
erations about their care, or they are acutely ill and deci-
sions about inclusion into trials need to be made on an
emergency basis (eg trials of alternative modes of perform-
ing cardio-pulmonary resuscitation). The former problem
has had a relatively straightforward solution in the USA,
where both ethics and law have almost uniformly recog-
nized the legitimacy of surrogates to make medical deci-
sions for incompetent patients, including in most cases
providing consent for therapeutic research. This is often
not the case in Europe, where surrogate decision-making
remains more controversial [3].
The difficulties of performing research on emergency
interventions was recently recognized in the USA by the
Department of Health and Human Services, which
responded by creating an emergency exemption to
informed consent in situations where the experimental
intervention must be introduced emergently and where
the patient is both unable to consent and surrogate deci-
sion-makers are not available [4]. This exemption has
been strongly opposed by some critics as a dangerous
precedent away from an uncompromising commitment to
informed consent for research, but several trials utilizing
this intervention are currently under way [5].
The third characteristic of the critical care environment
that places unique demands upon research is the often
rapidly changing and developing nature of the technologies
being tested. Many ICU interventions involve complex
technical procedures or sophisticated mechanical devices
[eg extracorporeal membrance oxygenation (ECMO), con-
tinuous venovenous hemofiltration (CVVH), high-
frequency oscillatory ventilation (HFOV)] that have a steep
learning curve and that undergo almost continual evolution
through the ‘tinkering’ of skilled and creative clinicians.
This creates an inevitable tension in the efforts of
researchers when they want to show that these new tech-
niques are an improvement over previous therapies. On the
one hand, it is important that the clinicians develop these
ICU = intensive care unit; ECMO = extracorporeal membrane oxygenation; CVVH = continuous venovenous hemofiltration; HFOV = high-
frequency oscillatory ventilation.interventions to the point where they feel they have
mastered the most critical technical challenges and have
overcome the major hurdles of applying the technology to
critically ill patients. On the other hand, it is important
that the clinicians not miss a ‘window of opportunity’ for
rigorously comparing these new technologies against
standard therapy in a formal clinical trial, before the
technologies become uncritically and widely accepted
into clinical practice.
This inherent tension is compounded by the need to stan-
dardize the treatments in both the experimental and
control arms of a clinical trial. Consider, for example,
recent clinical trials of neonatal ECMO in the USA and
the UK. Each of these trials took several years to com-
plete. During these intervals, ECMO technology under-
went continuous evolution, ranging from developments in
catheter design to alternatives in anticoagulation to new
surgical approaches (such as venovenous ECMO as an
alternative to venoarterial, repair rather than ligation of the
carotid artery). Similarly, during the time-frame of these
trials there were major innovations in nonECMO inter-
ventions, such as the emergence of HFOV, nitric oxide
therapy, and permissive hypercarbia. During the period of
the trials, centers performing under protocol had to accept
a virtual freeze on any inclination to either tinker with
their approach to ECMO or to introduce any modifications
to the ‘control’ protocols. This moratorium on innovation
impacted the trials in two major respects: first, by the end
of the trials, the families of children in the control arm
could no longer be assured that they were in fact receiving
the best standard clinical care (since centers not involved
in the protocol had progressed to using alternative strate-
gies); second, evolution in the technology of ECMO itself
was sufficiently different by the end of the studies that
the results of the trials could truthfully only be said to
apply to a form of ECMO that was already obsolete. The
moral of the story is this: when both the experimental
therapies and the standard therapies are in rapid evolu-
tion, standard approaches to comparing them through
formal clinical trials are often too time-consuming, leading
to restrictions on clinical innovation and results that are
already obsolete by the time they are published.
Each of these three considerations raises interesting ques-
tions about how to modify our approach to research in the
ICU in ways that will continue to respect the fundamental
principles of Nuremberg while continuing to allow for the
advancement of medical knowledge. In the remainder of
my comments, I will return to the first issue cited above,
namely the conflicts that occur when experimental
therapies are potentially life saving.
Perhaps the most fundamental ethical dilemma in
medical research concerns the potential for conflict of
interest between the roles of the physician as clinician
versus the physician as scientific investigator. Acting in
the role of clinician, the physician’s highest priority is the
welfare of the individual patient. The goals of the scien-
tific investigator, on the other hand, are focused upon the
acquisition of medical knowledge in order to benefit
future patients. One recent paper characterized this
dichotomy in terms of ‘individual ethics’ versus ‘collec-
tive ethics’, or ‘doing what is best for current subjects in
the trial versus doing what is best for future patients who
stand to benefit from its results’ [6].
How does the clinician resolve the conflict between these
divergent roles? One suggestion has been to insist that the
clinician be in a state of equilibrium, or ‘equipoise’,
regarding the relative efficacy of the various treatments
being studied. In other words, if the clinician is com-
pletely undecided as to which of the treatments is best,
then there is no conflict of interest in choosing between
these treatments by the ‘flip of a coin’.
This standard, described as ‘personal equipoise’, has long
been recognized as being too stringent. To begin with, vir-
tually all clinical investigators enter into clinical trials with
the belief that their intervention is superior to existing
treatments. Otherwise, why would they spend the enor-
mous amounts of time and energy involved with perform-
ing the studies necessary to demonstrate this superiority?
Furthermore, based upon their personal experience and
individualized reading of the literature, clinicians fre-
quently have strongly held opinions about which of the
alternative interventions is the most effective, even if the
published evidence is far from conclusive. Under the per-
sonal equipoise standard, these clinicians would be ethi-
cally barred from participating in randomized comparisons
of these interventions.
Benjamin Freedman is generally credited with proposing an
escape from this dilemma, based upon the concept of ‘clini-
cal equipoise’ [7]. Clinical equipoise exists when there is
uncertainty about the relative efficacy of alternative treat-
ments within the medical community as a whole. Freed-
man claimed that a state of clinical equipoise is necessary
for physicians to ethically enroll patients in clinical trials. It
is not necessary for a clinician to be in personal equipoise in
order to enroll a patient, Freedman argued, so long as there
is genuine uncertainty within the medical community, ie so
long as there is a state of clinical equipoise.
The concept of clinical equipoise has been very useful in
relieving the ethical tensions between clinicians and inves-
tigators in most types of clinical trials. To give an example,
if I believe that a new b-blocker offers advantages over
those currently on the market, I can, with a clear con-
science, enroll my patients in a randomized trial that com-
pares the new medication with another that is standardly
available. I simply explain to my patients that, even though
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prove to be better than the alternatives, they should be
willing to have their therapy determined by a flip of the
coin, since there is as yet no convincing evidence to
support my belief in the superiority of the new drug.
The concept of clinical equipoise is less convincing,
however, when it is used to justify the randomization of
treatments that have the potential to be life saving. I will
use the history and development of neonatal ECMO as a
paradigmatic type of ICU research that also provides an
excellent case study for exploring this issue [8].
ECMO emerged in the 1960s when development of the
membrane oxygenator permitted the use of cardiopul-
monary bypass for periods of more than a few hours.
Although early efforts in the use of ECMO for adults with
acute respiratory failure were disappointing, interest per-
sisted in the use of ECMO to treat neonatal respiratory
failure. Robert Bartlett therefore used this new therapy to
treat 16 critically ill infants, and reported six survivors.
Encouraged by these initial results, Bartlett continued to
develop the technology, and by 1980 achieved 75% survival
in patients judged to have a 95% mortality when managed
with conventional therapy [9]. Despite this success, many
remained skeptical about the effectiveness of ECMO in the
absence of a formal clinical trial. Bartlett realized the need
for a rigorous comparison of ECMO against standard
therapy, but was concerned about denying some patients a
therapy he viewed as potentially life-saving.
Should Bartlett have relied upon Freedman’s concept of
clinical equipoise, and proceeded with a randomized clini-
cal trial comparing ECMO against standard therapy? In
1980 there was clearly uncertainty within the medical
community about the relative benefits of ECMO, and
indeed most neonatologists were biased against it. Yet I
believe that Bartlett was correct in viewing clinical
equipoise as an inadequate justification for proceeding
with a traditional randomized comparison of ECMO
against standard therapy, for at least two reasons.
First, imagine what doctor–patient relationships would be
like if doctors always took clinical equipoise seriously.
Imagine a physician saying, ‘My personal opinion would be
to begin antibiotics for possible sepsis in a patient with your
signs and symptoms. Nevertheless, since there is disagree-
ment about this in the medical literature and the medical
community more generally, I will decide whether or not to
start you on antibiotics by flipping a coin’. Such a doctor
would probably command little respect from his patients or
colleagues, yet this is precisely what is demanded of the
doctor when enrolling patients in clinical trials.
Second, the structure of randomized clinical trials often
requires them to continue beyond the point at which
clinical equipoise has already dissolved. Consider a hypo-
thetical trial that, based on power calculations, is sched-
uled to enroll 1000 patients. Suppose that almost all of the
patients have been enrolled, and that the P value is
already well below 0.05. Based upon standard research
procedure, however, the investigators are forbidden from
analyzing the data until all of the patients have been
enrolled (I am here ignoring the possibility of early stop-
ping rules). Assuming that the outcomes from the few
remaining patients do not have the potential to raise the P
value above the significance threshold, then all remaining
patients who are randomized into the control arm of the
study will receive a treatment that will soon be shown to
be inferior to the alternative.
What ethical justifications could be offered to defend the
randomization of these remaining patients into the
control arm of the study, other than a justification (based
upon a ‘collective’ rather than an ‘individual’ ethic) that
sacrifices the best interests of these patients in favor of
producing knowledge that will benefit future patients?
While some patients may find this sacrifice acceptable for
many types of trials (eg the b-blocker study mentioned
above), few would be willing to risk their lives by not
receiving the superior treatment, especially if the value of
their sacrifice was only to move the P value a little lower
below the level of 0.05.
Perhaps it was these types of concerns that led Bartlett to
decide not to proceed with a traditional randomized clinical
trial in the evaluation of neonatal ECMO. The approach
that he adopted is one that has emerged within a growing
literature by statisticians who are sensitive to the ethical
concerns that may arise in randomized trials such as these
[6,10–14]. They have developed a number of innovative
and intriguing alternatives to traditional randomized trials
that seek to mitigate the inherent tension between the
goals of the physician as clinician and the goals of the
physician as scientific investigator. I believe these alterna-
tives have been underutilized in the design of clinical trials
in critical care medicine, and that the interests of individ-
ual patients have been unduly sacrificed to the interests of
medical knowledge and future patients. As one recent sta-
tistical review of these alternative approaches concluded,
‘when circumstances are appropriate, the failure to exploit
modern statistical methodology and information technol-
ogy is indefensible in present day clinical trials’ [6].
Bartlett chose one of the more straightforward (and intu-
itively compelling) alternative statistical techniques
known as ‘adaptive randomization’. Simply put, adaptive
randomization strategies alter the randomization scheme
so that more patients are assigned to the treatment that is
proving to be more successful. These methods are often
described as ‘play the winner’ strategies, although it would
be more accurate to refer to them as ‘play the leader’.
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50/50 randomization of the first patient to either conventional
treatment or ECMO, with the randomization of subse-
quent patients heavily weighted toward whatever therapy
was proving more successful. Unfortunately, by heavily
biasing the randomization in this way, he ended up with a
very skewed distribution between the two treatments.
Eleven patients were assigned to ECMO, and all survived.
Only one patient was assigned to conventional therapy,
and this child died [15].
This study illustrates that, when adaptive randomization is
taken to an extreme, it may produce results that, while
perhaps statistically sound, are clinically unconvincing.
The Bartlett trial was therefore widely criticized, and in an
editorial that accompanied the published manuscript, a
statistician and neonatologist from Harvard claimed that a
better study was needed before the superiority of ECMO
could be accepted [16].
Not surprisingly, however, when this same Harvard team
met to design a better trial, they faced the same ethical
dilemma that had plagued Bartlett. In addition to Bartlett’s
published experience, a national ECMO registry was also
accumulating data that showed impressive survival rates
with ECMO. A 1988 review of 715 newborns treated with
ECMO, for example, demonstrated 81% survival with
ECMO and indicated that ECMO was statistically superior
to any other treatment with a survival rate less than 78.4%
[17]. Few neonatologists at that time could have argued
that survival rates of critically ill newborns managed
without ECMO were anywhere close to 78.4%.
As a result, the Harvard team also decided to use an
adaptive randomization design, choosing only to be less
extreme than Bartlett. In the Harvard design, patients
were randomized 50/50 to either ECMO or conventional
treatment until there was a fourth death in either arm of
the study (Phase 1); at that point, all future patients
were randomized to the more successful arm, and this
was continued until statistical significance was achieved
(Phase 2) [18].
Using this more conservative design, the Harvard study
achieved more convincing results. During Phase I, nine
patients were assigned to ECMO and all survived. Ten
patients received conventional therapy; six survived and
four died. With the fourth death in the conventional arm,
Phase II began. An additional 20 patients were enrolled to
receive ECMO; 19 survived and one died. At this point
ECMO was judged to be statistically superior to conven-
tional therapy. In retrospect, four patients died who might
have survived if they had been offered ECMO. Neverthe-
less, this was a smaller number than would have died if
the trial had been designed with traditional 50/50 random-
ization. To this extent, adaptive randomization was suc-
cessful in both demonstrating the superiority of ECMO
and in reducing the total number of deaths.
Given the ethical advantages of adaptive randomization
designs, why are they not used more frequently in the
evaluation of potentially life saving therapies in intensive
care medicine? ‘Adaptive methods should be used as a
matter of course’, remarked statistician Weinstein in The
New England Journal [19]. ‘It never pays to commit oneself
to a protocol under which information available before the
study or obtained during its course is ignored in the treat-
ment of a patient’ [19].
Despite endorsements like this, adaptive randomization,
as well as other statistically sound alternatives to the tra-
ditional randomized trial, continue to be utilized rarely.
Some have suggested that this bias is based upon a
reluctance to take a risk in the highly competitive
process of grant proposals, but many factors are probably
involved [6].
The ECMO story itself provides a striking example of this
prejudice against adaptive randomization designs. In the
early 1990s, the UK was considering whether to adopt
ECMO into its armamentarium of treatment for neonatal
respiratory failure. After considering all of the above evi-
dence, clinicians in the UK concluded that the superiority
of ECMO to conventional management was still in doubt,
and that a traditional randomized controlled trial was
needed before accepting ECMO for widespread use in the
UK. Between 1993 and 1995, 185 newborns were random-
ized into a traditional trial of ECMO versus standard
therapy. The trial was stopped early on the advice of a
data monitoring committee when preliminary evidence
showed a clear advantage of ECMO. Overall, 30 of 93
infants allocated to ECMO died, compared with 54 of 92
allocated to conventional care (P=0.0005) [20].
Certainly there are no grounds to impugn either the
motives or the intentions of the researchers from the UK
who conceived and executed this trial. Nevertheless, just
as some have questioned whether clinical equipoise
existed at the time of the Harvard ECMO trial, I think it is
fair to ask whether clinical equipoise existed at the time of
the UK ECMO trial, and whether the trial thereby met one
of the standard ethical requirements for clinical research
[21]. In any case, the UK trial served to illustrate the bias
that currently exists against accepting the results of trials
that employ adaptive randomization, and, by extension,
any other alternatives to the traditional approach.
The UK trial also raises questions about how we deter-
mine which treatments should be considered ‘experimen-
tal’ and which ‘control’. Given the evidence gathered from
clinical experience and research in the USA prior to 1993,
a good case could have been made for at least presuming
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If so, then perhaps patients who were eligible for the UK
trial but whose families refused to participate should have
been offered ECMO as the ‘control’ treatment, rather
than so-called conventional therapy [21].
The development of ECMO has perhaps provided as
many interesting questions and insights into the process of
study design and informed consent as it has into the man-
agement of neonatal respiratory failure. The UK investiga-
tors have continued this tradition by expanding upon their
trial to explore the experiences of the families who were
involved to learn more about their attitudes toward
informed consent and alternative schemes of randomiza-
tion [2,22,23]. ECMO has therefore been a paradigmatic
case study for many of the types of trials that have been
and will be performed in intensive care medicine. We
should not lose the opportunity to learn from these experi-
ences, since, as Santayana observed, ‘those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it’.
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